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I begin with two quotations, which express how writing can draw attention to the 
strangeness and unknowability of the self: 
I have become a problem to myself, like land which a farmer works only with 
difficulty and at the cost of much sweat. For I am not now investigating the tracts 
of the heavens, or measuring the distance of the stars, or trying to discover how the 
earth hangs in space. I am investigating myself, my memory, my mind. There is 
nothing strange in the fact that whatever is not myself is far from me. But what could 
be nearer to me than myself? Yet I do not understand the power of memory that is in 
myself(Augustine, [1912] 1961, p. 223). 
For I is an other. If brass wakes as a bugle, it is not its fault at all. That is quite 
clear to me: I am a spectator at the flowering of my thought: I watch it, I listen to it: 
I draw a bow across a string: a symphony stirs in the depths, or surges onto the stage 
(Rimbaud, [1967] 1994, p. 275). 
These quotations illustrate the experience of the writer: in the act of writing, the self 
appears to the self as strange, as other. Augustine, in the writing of his autobiography, 
reflects upon the power of memory, and realises that it is beyond comprehension. 
Thus in trying to articulate what he is and has been, he becomes a question to himself, 
something he cannot understand. He states that although there is nothing nearer to him 
than himself, in writing he comes to see the knot of his own subjectivity as a problem 
that cannot be untangled and appears as strange. Thus, he goes on to question the 
nature of the self, as represented to himself in writing: 'What, then, am I, my God? 
What is my nature? A life that is ever varying, full of change, and of immense power' 
(Augustine, [1912] 1961, p. 224). For Rimbaud likewise, in the act of writing, the I is 
an other; he sees himself as a stranger whose thought he watches and listens to. 
The idea that in writing about experience we attend to otherness is provocative 
and opens up many questions about the relationship between the alterity of the self, 
of other people, of material objects and of language. In responding to Tsuji's paper, 
I will consider how the bringing to presence of the self's otherness is related to the 
self's relation of responsibility to other people, with particular reference to Emmanuel 
Levinas. 
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UNABLE TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF 
In writing autobiographically, the only account I can give of myself is partial. I can 
only bring myself to presence in language as hidden, a fragment of myself, and this 
fragmented, opaque account makes 'me' into a question and draws my attention to 
my own unknowability, that I will always be an other to myself. This is so in writing 
and in any attempt to represent the self. In the case of the photograph, for example, 
Versilov in The Possessed compares the human's lack of permanent identity with 
an actual portrait: 'Photography seldom shows real resemblance; that is, of course, 
quite natural because the original, we ourselves, is seldom the same' (Dostoevsky 
quoted in Hubben, [1952] 1997, p. 63). Tsuji suggested that in writing we 'can be 
attentively responsive to an otherness to ourselves', but how does this otherness relate 
to the otherness of others? Levinas's writing on subjectivity provides a helpful way of 
thinking about the relation between the otherness of self, neighbour and language. 
Emmanuel Levinas describes the strangeness of the self in its relation to the 
neighbour thus: 
'I am an other', but this is not the alienation Rimbaud refers to. 1 am outside of any 
place, in myself, on the hither side of the autonomy of auto-affection and identity 
resting on itself .... The self is the very fact of being exposed under the accusation that 
cannot be assumed, where the ego supports the others, unlike the certainty of the ego 
that rejoins itself in freedom (Levinas, [1974] 1998, p. ll8). 
Thus, while Rimbaud suggests that the I is an other, in that in writing I can see it 
as something other, as strange, in the same way that I see others, for Levinas, the 
strangeness of the I is found in its relation to the neighbour. In Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas describes the way the subject is found only in its relation of responsibility to 
the Other. I am always turned towards the outside, passive to the approach of the Other, 
who elects me to responsibility. The face of the Other in its vulnerability addresses me 
and looks for my response. I am thus called to a position of responsibility and I am 
thereby called to my identity as a unique subject: I alone can respond to the address 
the Other presents to me, and this is my subjectivity. It is through being receptive to 
the address of the Other and the meaning they invest in my response that I can have 
language. In being thus called to this position of responsibility, I am outside of any 
'place': responsibility is a null-site, an act of exposure to the Other who addresses 
me. I therefore cannot possess myself in reflection or writing because I am always in 
movement towards the Other who is ever beyond me, assuming my responsibility for 
them. 
For Levinas, responsibility means that I am 'in myself', but to be in my own skin in 
this way means to be 'under the weight of the other', exposed, rather than an ego free 
in-itself and for-itself. As a subject, I am in exile, de-posed from my place, withdrawn 
from manifestation, strange to myself as always 'on the hither side of ... auto-affection'. 
Thomas Carl Wall describes how as always for-the-other, surrendering itself to the 
other, subjectivity 'is nothing but a primordial delay behind the Other. This is absolute 
passivity ... The subject would be forever devoted to an obligation that would forever 
exceed it' (Wall, 1999, p. 40). The subject then is always strange, in its exile outside 
of its own place, through the responsibility to which it is summoned by the other, and 
any representation of the self in the act of writing draws attention to the fact that'!, am 
already different to the writer of those words, as a self always in movement. 
Levinas describes that relation to the Other as a relation in which I am taught, further 
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emphasising the idea of the self in a state of perpetual transformation through its 
relation with alterity, always being extended, as in this much-quoted passage: 
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at 
each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore 
to receive from the Other beyond the Capacity of the I, which means exactly: to 
have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the 
Other, or conversation, is a non-allergic relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this 
conversation is a teaching [enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; 
it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent 
transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced (Levinas, [1969] 2004, p. 51). 
The self, for Levinas, is always passively formed through the Other's approach, 
which 'brings me more than I contain'. Thus, it is only as one receptive to the Other's 
approach that I am and can be one possessed of language. This notion of language 
is, for Levinas, intimately bound up with what cannot be represented in . language. In 
Otherwise than Being, Levinas suggests that language is both the Saying and the Said. 
The Saying is the address, the offering of signs to another. It is thus described by 
Levinas as signification, the source of all meaning, but beyond meaning, and radically 
different from thematization. 
The Said is the thematization that takes place in language. The Saying, the very 
opening of the address, cannot be written. As an example of a written text, Otherwise 
Than Being is particularly provocative as an attempt to draw attention to the Saying. 
The ethical language of Otherwise than Being, its disturbance of its own said through 
a textual performance which often endangers meaning and comprehension, can 
be seen as an attempt to exemplify this idea of a saying which itself slips through 
comprehension. There are similarities between writing as performance and the idea 
of writing as gesture. In the text of Otherwise than Being, Levinas is gesturing to 
his reader, drawing their attention to the knot of subjectivity, to the strangeness of 
the other and the strangeness of the self: the saying of the text interrupts the said and 
remains beyond the content exposed in the said. Otherwise than Being thus draws the 
reader's attention to the tension always present within language, both thematizing the 
saying, whilst also showing its trace that must always remain beyond the said. On this 
interruption of the said, Levinas states: 
And I still interrupt the ultimate discourse in which all discourses are stated, in saying 
it to the one who listens to it... In the writing the saying does indeed become a pure 
said, a simultaneousness of the saying and of its conditions. A book is interrupted 
discourse catching up with its own breaks (Levinas, [1981] 2004, pp. 170-171). 
Writing therefore is only possible because of the self having been addressed by the 
Other and been given the possibility of language and meaning through that address, 
and all writing is in turn a form of address to an other. 
The question of writing, and particularly writing about the self, as raised by Tsuji, 
turns the question of otherness back towards the self. There is almost a triangulation 
in writing about the self and experience, of a self formed in relation to the Other, then 
reflecting upon itself as brought to subjectivity by the other, in a text which is also 
addressed to an other. Augustine's Confessions, one of the most important texts in the 
history of the development of autobiographical writing is particularly indicative of how 
this intimates to us the limits of knowledge. The Confessions is written as in many 
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ways a prayerful address to the divine, a text in which Augustine reflects upon what 
he is, and how through his relations with others he has become the person he is at the 
point of writing. In writing he draws attention to the fact that that text is addressed to 
an Other (for him, God is the ultimate unknowable Other), and also that he sees the self 
as existing only as one in a movement of desire for the Other, a desire for one who is 
beyond language and knowledge. As a self who is always changing, always becoming 
through that desire and movement towards the beyond Being, he recognises that he is 
always fragmented and beyond representation and paradoxically it is writing that draws 
attention to that. The writing of (anti-)autobiographical texts must therefore be seen, 
as Atsuko suggests, as educative in a very profound sense. Such texts allow the self to 
attend to the invading otherness that leads to the changing nature of the self and thereby 
allows us to consider the conditions that have led to the particular discourse of which 
I am now part. In attending to these conditions, I see something of the others and the 
discourses that have brought me to this conversation, but I cannot give a full account of 
these: I can never fully narrate the conditions of my subjectivity. My writing can only 
give a partial account of myself and that account, in its fragmented nature, will always 
seem strange and a failed reflection of my own experiences. It is only as a self formed 
in relation to the otherness of other people that I can write and attend to the refracted 
otherness of myself in my writing. So it is only as one who is in movement towards an 
Other, in a dizzying position of ethical responsibility for the Other than I am a subject, 
beautifully expressed by Kristeva when she writes, in Tales of Love, 'I am, in love, at 
the zenith of subjectivity' (Kristeva, [1983] 1987, p. 5). 
In relation to Tsuji's paper and the question of the otherness of the self in writing, 
the following points also occur to me as related to the theme of the otherness of the self 
and the otherness of experience in writing. 
JUDITH BUTLER'S 'GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF' 
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler explores the question of the opacity of 
the subject, through dialogue with the writings of Levinas, Foucault and Adorno. She 
demonstrates in this work that any aspiration to self-knowledge must acknowledge the 
impermeability of the self, yet at the same time, holds onto the notions of autonomy 
and agency, which are considered so important as pedagogical aims. Butler extends 
Levinas's writing on the otherness of the Other via a Foucauldian interpretation to 
consider how social discourses, beyond the self, create the· self. At the same time, the 
self is always being addressed and thereby called to a position of ethical responsibility, 
called to give an account of itself, to answer for its actions and words, even if a full 
articulation can never be given. Thus she considers how in the mode of address, 
we can transform ourselves and re-draft ourselves in the act of taking responsibility, 
which has significant implications for a notion of subjectivity in education in which a 
subjectivated self still retains the power of autonomy. The following paragraphs from 
Giving an Account of Oneself illustrate this idea: 
The self at issue is clearly 'formed' within a set of social conventions that raise the 
question whether a good life can be conducted within a bad one, and whether we 
might, in recrafting ourselves within and for another, participate in the remaking of 
social conditions .... 
Perhaps most importantly, we must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves 
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precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies 
before us, when our willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes 
our chance of becoming human. To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an 
anguish, to be sure, but also a chance-to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not 
me, but also to be moved, to be prompted, to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so 
to vacate the self-sufficient'!' as a kind of possession. If we speak and try to give an 
account from this place, we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be 
forgiven (Butler, 2005, pp. 134-136). 
Linked to this more Foucauldian paradigm, it might be interesting to consider the 
question of the otherness of the self in relation to the idea of self-reflexivity and the 
practices of the care of the self. 
HEIDEGGER, BENJAMIN AND ADORNO ON THE OTHERNESS OF LANGUAGE 
Tsuji's paper touched on the otherness of language in its mimetic function. This could 
be explored further in relation to Heidegger and Adorno's writings on the nature of 
language. Heidegger's later writings on the nature of language suggest that language 
is poetry in its purest form, and that language brings things to presence and reveals 
their nature as unsayable. Thus he states that language 'names', but the naming is not 
a designation: 'This naming does not hand out titles. It does not apply titles, but it calls 
into the word. The naming calls' (Heidegger, [1971] 2001, p. 196). The naming calls 
that which is concealed to come to language as unconcealed, thus instituting Being. 
We can see this idea in The Origin of the Work of Art: 'Language, by naming beings 
for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming 
nominates beings to their being from out of their being' (ibid., p. 71). We could see 
here a sense in which the notion of poiesis as not just the art of poetry, but also the act 
of making or forming is suggested by this sense of poetry as the bringing to Being. 
But this bringing to Being through language also means a bringing to being as in some 
sense beyond speaking, as unsayable. Thus Heidegger writes: 'Projective saying is 
poetry ... Poetry is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is ... Projective saying is 
saying which, in preparing the unsayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such 
into a world' (ibid.). This is why poetry is language in its purest form. It shows the 
unsayable as such, revealing it to be other than the word, in a sense beyond language 
even while being brought to presence as hidden by language. Thus the unsayable-ness 
of what is can never be said in language, even while this is revealed precisely through 
language. 
There are similarities with Benjamin's view of language: 'In all language and 
linguistic creations there remains in addition to what can be conveyed something that 
cannot be communicated; depending on the context in which it appears, it is something 
that symbolizes or something symbolized' (Benjamin, [1968] 1999, p. 80). This idea 
of language bringing to presence the unsayable has implications for how we view the 
nature of language in learning. In particular Adorno's writings on the mimetic and 
identitarian functions of language and the way that identity thinking can lead to an 
attitude of domination might be considered in relation to this idea of an attitude of 
attentiveness and ethical responsibility towards otherness. All of these views highlight 
the impossibility of writing to 'capture' experience, as Agamben suggests, 'experience 
[is] the transcendental limit of language [and thus] rules out language as being in itself 
totality and truth' (Agamben, 1993, p. 51). Thus, their writing can help us attend 
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further to the opacity and strangeness of experience, the way it slips through language 
and draws attention to the limits of language and knowledge and the strangeness and 
opacity of the self as one who has and narrates experience. 
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